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Enforcement, ranging from threats to intimidation to assault to homicide, has long 
been an established practice within criminal networks. However, comparatively little 
academic research exists about the nature and role of enforcers within and beyond the context 
of contract killings. Drawing on qualitative interviews with criminal enforcers from two 
contrasting sites within the UK—the West Scotland and the West Midlands—the current 
study examines the articulated, identifiable pathways into criminal enforcement. Also it 
examines the nuanced nature of enforcement and the roles those men commonly adopt within 
the context of organised crime, as well as the relationship between these men’s activity, the 
wider context of organised crime, and presence of social and cultural capital within it. This 
article provides insights into how one becomes an enforcer; how contact is made between all 
parties involved; the degree of planning involved; and costing arrangements, with important 
implications for research and practice.  
 













































































What exactly does it mean to be a criminal ‘enforcer’?  To what extent and in what 
ways does this intertwine with violence and the adoption of the role of ‘hitmen’? Both terms 
conjure up images of glamour and professionalism in the underworld. However, very little is 
known about the lived experience of muscle for hire. Accordingly, this paper seeks to add to 
and extend the somewhat limited existing scholarship on enforcers, and the nuanced nature of 
their roles.  It combines unique qualitative data sets gathered in two geographical locations in 
the UK – West Scotland and the West Midlands, focused on in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with people involved in enforcement activities. Through comparative analysis of 
their extended narratives, we zero-in on their motivations for and roles within enforcement 
contexts in different geographical locations. In so doing, we seek to add to the emerging 
literature on UK organised crime (e.g. Antonopoulos 2016; Hall et al. 2017; Campana & 
Varese 2018; Rahman 2019) and the nuanced roles associated with underworld enforcement, 
arguing as we do that – contrary to popular mythology – there is a spectrum of enforcement 
roles in the criminal underworld. 
In the first section, we outline the insights from the extant literature on organised 
crime, begin to interrogate the somewhat limited existing scholarship on criminal 
enforcement, and argue that the concepts extend beyond the rather narrow and dark role of 
‘hitmen’.  Secondly, we outline the research methods used to gather data in both of our 
geographical settings. Thirdly, we present the findings from the data under thematic themes. 
Fourth and finally, drawing on insights from Bourdieu (1985, 1986, 1990) as well as the 
wider extant literature on criminal enforcement, we draw together a summary of our main 






































































Organised Crime and Criminal Enforcement 
Organised crime (OC) is a somewhat nebulous concept that ishotly debated by 
criminologists (Kelly & Caputo 2005; von Lampe 2016; Bjorgo 2017). Traditionally, 
organised crime groups (OCGs) were viewed as fiercely competitive and hierarchical, but 
contemporary evidence suggests more loosely affiliated networks of criminals who coalesce 
around certain criminal opportunities, often lacking a rigid hierarchy (Finckenauer 2005). 
There is emerging consensus that OC tends to be a productive activity, involving the 
provision of illicit goods and services (Varese 2010; Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou 2018; 
McLean et al. 2018). Under this umbrella falls a wide variety of goods and services, such as 
drugs, child criminal exploitation, human trafficking, fraud and forgery, money laundering, 
the infiltration of business operations, and the corruption of public officials and the political 
process (Finckenauer 2005; Gottschalk and Markovic 2015; Bjørgo 2017).  
Another aspect of OC is the regulation of illicit production, services and exchange, 
such as controlling the supply of ‘protection’ against extortion, theft, property rights and the 
settlement of various disputes (Varese 2010; Wang 2013). The view of Mafias as ‘enforcers’, 
for example, was proposed by Schelling (1984) and developed further by Gambetta (1996), 
who argued that violence was a necessary resource for the ‘protection’ of illicit markets. 
Mafiosi must be able to resort to violence, Gambetta (1996, p.40) argued, because ‘the ability 
to inflict punishment is crucial to the role of guarantor’.   
According to Finkenauer (2005, p.66) ‘the ability to use, and the reputation for use of, 
violence or the threat of violence to facilitate criminal activities’ is indeed a central feature of 
illicit networks. While criminals do cooperate, including within the context of local and 
global opportunity structures (Hobbs 2013),  many illegal transactions occur without recourse 
to violence (Vargas 2014). Illicit markets, by definition, cannot be regulated by contracts and 




































































violence’ (Wright 2006) that is calculated to secure the growth and survival of the criminal 
enterprise. Strategic violence takes many forms (Reuter 2009): internal to discipline a 
difficult workforce and discourage informants; external to manage market competition or 
contraction; and transactional to resolve disagreements about the terms of a deal. OCGs may 
outsource such violence, insulating themselves from the consequences of its use (Kelly & 
Caputo 2005). Payment for a killing, for example, provides a ‘useful remove between the 
person who benefits and the killer or killers themselves’ (MacIntyre et al. 2014 p.326). 
 
Hitmen and the Extreme End of Enforcement 
In the most extreme cases of enforcement, targeted homicides are extended  to 
eliminate an ‘obstacle’ or underworld ‘rival’ (Rahman 2019; Wilson & Rahman 2015). 
Criminal ‘hits’ have been defined as ‘the targeting of specific individuals for murder’ 
whereby a third party is contracted for political, economic or personal gain (Shaw & 
Skywalker, 2016: p.382). A hitman is a criminal undertaker (Hall 2012), a person ‘who 
accepts an order to kill another human being from someone who is not publicly 
acknowledged as a legitimate authority regarding “just killing” for financial or material gain’ 
(Brolan et al. 2016: p.221). Such a distinction separates hitmen from soldiers and state 
executioners (MacIntyre et al. 2014: p.326).  
Prior work has classified hitmen as ‘amateurs’, ‘semi-professionals’ and 
‘professionals’ based on specific patterns and characteristics (Schlesinger 2001). MacIntyre 
et al. (2014: p.334-347) similarly distinguish between ‘novice’ hitmen who are trainees or 
beginners in the crime, and older ‘dilettante’ hitmen, who may not necessarily come from an 
offending background but may simply accept a contract as a means of resolving a personal 
(often financial) crisis and engage in the killing with little enthusiasm and minimal skill. 




































































necessarily exceptional, and ‘masters’, who comes closest to Schlesinger’s (2001) 
‘professional’ category. ‘Masters’ often come from military or paramilitary backgrounds and 
tend to exist in the shadows—these ‘ghosts’ often evade justice owing to their transient 
lifestyle, travelling into communities to kill and leaving immediately afterward (see also 
Wilson & Rahman 2015).  
Research suggests that conventionally violent occupations such as the military can be 
fertile recruiting grounds for hitmen (MacIntyre et al. 2014; Van de Blunt et al., 2014). In 
attempting to consider what ultimately might drive someone to become a hitman, however, 
Wilson and Rahman (2015: p.263) argue that motivations are mostly economic. They argue 
some hitmen neutralise their intended victims as ‘targets’, reframe their actions as ‘just 
money’ and ultimately view their job as ‘shoot to kill’ — thus, separating their ‘morally-
responsible selves’ as a means of being able to kill, while also de-personalising their intended 
victims. 
 
A Continuum of Enforcement 
Professional hitmen obviously represent the apex of criminal enforcement. They are 
the most widely researched of criminal enforcers and best known publicly owing to (at times 
exaggerated) media portrayals of hitmen acting on behalf of mafias and global criminal 
networks to conduct ‘hits’ in ‘smoky rooms, bars and casinos frequented by gangsters’ 
(MacIntyre et al. 2014, p.326). However, criminal enforcement is woven into the fabric of 
any provision of illicit goods and services. Some OCGs employ enforcers whose task is to 
‘employ violence to maintain or advance a criminal enterprise’ (Rahman 2019, p.75), 
whereas others subcontract less lethal activities, such as threats or intimidation or monitoring 




































































could be said to exist on a continuum, with simple debt collecting and other forms of less 
lethal coercive activity on one end and dark interactions like contract killing on the other.  
The wider literature on organised crime acknowledges that enforcement roles may be 
more nuanced than the hitman classification (Rahman 2019), and that while the act of 
enforcement will invariably represent an intention to uphold a powerful foothold in the 
underworld, it may not always involve extreme violence. It is for this reason that the current 
study takes a broader view of enforcement, defining criminal enforcers as any member or an 
associate of a criminal organisation who engages in an extra-legal approach to governance  
which leads to resolving any unsettled dispute that goes against organisational or mutually 
agreed rules and deals. This is necessary owing to the diversification of OC (Hobbs 2013) 
and the articulation and evolution of groups like street gangs into OC (Densley 2014; 
McLean 2018).  
Conceptually, an enforcer can be viewed as someone who takes ‘special liberties’, 
which according to Hall and Winlow (2015) means that a person takes a position of 
entitlement, which warrants harmful behaviour for expressive and instrumental desires. 
Enforcers exist on a spectrum of roles that may contradict extant research and mythology that 
focuses almost exclusively on ‘hitmen’.  In our own study, we attempt to move beyond the 
existing simplistic accounts that conflate underworld enforcement with hitmen to recognise 
and explore further the distinction between contract killing and the wider roles associated 
with criminal enforcement. 
 
The Current Study 
Although there has been some limited criminological literature that has focused on the 
profiles and motivations of hitmen (e.g., MacIntyre et al. 2014; Rahman 2019; Schlesinger 




































































into the people who work in other aspects of underworld enforcement; that is, the nature and 
role of criminal enforcers within and beyond the context of contract killings. This is 
understandable in part because these men often tend to occupy a secret, covert world 
(MacIntyre et al. 2014; Shaw & Skywalker, 2016), but the authors have unique access to this 
world.  
Our empirical research focused on two comparative sites within the UK: the West of 
Scotland and West Midlands. While each region has some notable differences in terms of 
demographics and population characteristics, both share a number of similarities pertinent to 
the current study. Both cities have long histories of OC (Chinn 2014; Davies 2013) and have 
produced some of Britain’s most notorious underworld figures, including Robert Dawes, 
Jamie Daniel and Eddie Lyons. Both sites are major ‘hubs’ for illicit drugs (McLean et al. 
2020). They also suffer from deeply embedded ‘postcode’ violence and gangland feuds that 
have spilled out into the public domain—the West Midlands is widely associated with gun 
crime, and the West of Scotland with knife crime. As with any research, the sites were also 
chosen owing to researcher networks—the first and second author have unique access into 
the underworlds of both areas. All of which make for excellent comparative analysis.  
Through adopting a small-scale but in-depth qualitative approach, we focused on the 
following research questions: (1) What are the articulated, identifiable pathways into criminal 
enforcement for a small sample of men in these two geographical locations? (2) What roles 
do these men commonly adopt within the context of organised crime? (3) What is the 
relationship between these men’s activity, the wider context of organised crime and presence 






































































The participants in this research have been given pseudonyms to uphold ethical 
precepts.  Before commencing interviews, they were advised to not talk about any ongoing 
criminal activities that they were aware of, nor talk about any crimes that only they knew 
about. Also, they were counselled not to reveal personal information of any cases that they 
wanted to shed light on as a reference point for a question or a prompt that they were 
voluntarily responding to.  Ethical approval for this study was granted by the first and second 
authors’ universities. 
 
West Scotland  
Data from the West Scotland site are derived from a qualitative study of gangs and 
OC conducted in two shifts from 2012–2019 and encompassing interviews with a combined 
purposive and snowball sample of 65 (ex)offenders (53 men, 12 women) aged between 16 
and 55, who had engaged in behaviour defined as serious and OC (Scottish Government 
2015).  The current study draws on a limited account of these interviews.  While a significant 
number of participants in the study had engaged in some form of enforcement – via threats, 
assaults, and occasionally serious attacks – to varying degrees, it was rare for any participants 
to perceive their role as an active ‘enforcer’ first and foremost and, for example, a drug dealer 
second.  Only a handful of individuals saw their main role as an enforcer (often for specific 
groups or partnerships) or ‘muscle for hire’ more generally. It is this small minority within 
the sample group that the current study draws upon, in particular the participants Wi, Ge and 
Joe.  
At the time of interview Wi was in his 20s, but reflected upon his experiences to 
discuss how he moved from being a core member of a street gang to eventually working as an 
enforcer for a number of groups/individuals involved in serious and OC. The relationship he 




































































significantly to this transition. Ge is Wi’s best friend, and both have known each other since 
childhood. Like Wi, Ge was involved in street gangs and regularly engaged in violence. 
Unlike Wi, Ge is from a middle-class background. It is his ties to Wi that arguably played the 
greatest role in bringing him into enforcement practices. Joe on the other hand was an elder 
individual who was one of two main enforcers involved with a well-known OCG.  Joe was 
brought into such activities due to his local reputation as an ample fighter, displaying bravado 
and having a general lack of fear.  After a dispute over pay, along with other growing minor 
incidents, the OCG turned against Joe and sought to carry-out several attempted ‘hits’ against 
him. Joe in turn retaliated. The dispute remains unsettled to this day. Other participants 
include recently turned practitioner Matt, who drew upon his military experience and military 
connections to act as a freelance agent precuring weaponry and (anti)surveillance devices 
either for sale or hire, to help facilitate enforcement practices.   
Interviewees were initially accessed via gatekeepers at several charitable outreach 
organisations, including those working with (ex)offenders seeking to desist from crime. Most 
of the sample were interviewed once, although a few were interviewed numerous times. 
Interviews were mostly conducted face-to-face in a neutral public space, although some were 
conducted via  encrypted mobile messaging applications such as WhatsApp Messenger and  
Viber. A small number of interviews were also conducted in groups. Interviews typically 
lasted an hour or less. Thematic analysis took place thereafter.  
 
The Midlands 
Historically, the Midlands, especially the West Midlands is renowned for its criminal 
groups.  The internationally renowned TV series Peaky Blinders depicts the exploits of a 
crime family during the aftermath of World War I (Chinn 2014).  The findings from the 




































































between the months of June and August 2019.  The three men that were researched have 
previously been involved in extra-legal governance, namely within OC settings.  John, who 
had previously been interviewed for academic research on OC (BLIND), is a freelance 
private investigator, who is ex-military and is also an ex-police officer that worked during the 
peak of the Irish troubles.  As will be discussed later, John admits that his experiences as law 
enforcement and private investigator have served him well in his involvement within criminal 
enforcement.  Aaron was recently released from prison after serving time for multiple drug 
related offences.  He has previously worked as a doorman for several prominent nightclubs in 
Birmingham, West Midlands, and has extensive knowledge and links to the city’s 
underworld.  So too, through his work as a doorman, he has previously been involved in debt 
collecting for local businessmen and those who are submerged in the criminal landscape.  
Similarly, to Aaron, Theo has recently served prison time for drug related offences.  Before 
his incarceration, Theo was involved in debt collecting on a regular basis. 
Here it is important to note that all three men have not worked together, yet they have 
several commonalities that are worthy of consideration.  As will be revealed in the findings, 
they have all been involved in enforcement, namely in the context of debt collecting.  Thus, 
they have first-hand experiences of operating as paid enforcers, who have ‘planned’ and 
‘executed’ activities that have descriptions of underworld enforcement.  In addition, all three 
men offer narratives on how they have previously operated on behalf of businessmen as well 
members of criminal groups.   
 
Findings and Discussion 
Findings are presented thematically. The three themes speak to specific aspects of 
enforcement. These are ‘becoming an enforcer’, ‘the economics of enforcement, ‘planning 




































































which von Lampe (2008) considers to be a small degree of separation between legal and 
illegal economies.     
 
Becoming an Enforcer 
Like most serious crimes, OC does not operate within a social vacuum (Hobbs 2013; 
Deuchar 2018; Rahman 2019).  Indeed, it is a social phenomenon that has many interfaces 
when contrasted with the legitimate societal sphere.  The nexus between licit and illicit 
worlds are not dissimilar or aimed at avoiding one another.  Rather, OC has a routine of 
intermingling with its social environment.  Van de Bunt et al. (2014: p.322) argue that ‘social 
embeddedness means that existing relations and structures are not only the breeding ground 
for criminal activities, but also determine the form these activities can take’.  The notion of 
social embeddedness can be applied to occupation, gender relations and ethnic minorities.  As 
this paper reveals, enforcement, for some of the men in this study, is considered as an 
occupation.  However, before discussing how legitimate occupations can serve as fertile 
grounds for enforcement activities, this section will first consider what it takes to become an 
enforcer, as well as how social embeddedness and its underpinning variables facilitate this.   
The concept of social embeddedness derives from the field of economics.  Polanyi’s 
(1944) work on England’s social and political upheavals during the rise of the market 
economy argues how economic activity cannot be considered without taking into 
consideration the social and cultural framework within which this behaviour is situated.  Four 
decades later, Bourdieu (1985) developed similar thoughts by suggesting that explanations 
for economic behaviour are not only sought in “physical capital”, but also in “social capital”.  
In recent times, Bourdieu’s work has been influential when studying offenders.  Burgeoning 
criminological research in Western Europe has used social capital as a framework of 




































































some advancing Bourdieu’s initial work on capital so as to be able to produce 
groundbreaking perspectives of street level crime (Sandberg & Pedersen 2011; Harding 
2014).  Social capital is defined as ‘the sum of the  resources,  actual  or  virtual,  that  accrue  
to  an  individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p.119). 
While social capital may be viewed as a simple network of social connections, 
Bourdieu used it to explain the harsh realities of social inequality.  In short, social capital 
resonates with the saying: ‘It’s not what you know, it’s who you know’.  However, this view 
is not exclusive to the legitimate world, as the relational side of embeddedness is paramount 
when collaborating in illicit operations.  When asked whether social capital is needed to be a 
successful enforcer, John stated: 
 
100% social.  But it’s social in the criminal world.  You need to have that name.  
Everybody needs to know that you’re the person who collects the debts.  Often, you 
gain that criminal reputation and respect from the work that you’ve put in, the prison 
time that you’ve done, and those that you are affiliated to.  Everyone in the East 
Midlands knows who collects and who has the name.  
 
Aaron also believed that social capital is essential when operating as an enforcer, but 
also considered the importance of cultural capital:  
I’d say a combination of all.  Because if you’re just a Joe Bloggs coming up to me 
and you’re saying “yo, you owe some money”.  And I’ve never heard of you or 
you ain’t got nothing about ya in terms of you being able to look after yourself or 
being associated to a certain group or name, then I’m just going to tell you to fuck 
off.  However, if I know that you’re affiliated to a group or I know; “fuck me, 
he’ll be a handful if I don’t pay the money”, then it’s a whole different thing. 
 
Both men consider the significance of street social capital (Ilan 2013), which acts as an 
extension of street culture.  In doing so, they narratively establish that having a ‘name’ is 




































































ethnographic work of Anderson (1999), who alluded that street culture is often contingent 
upon informal ‘respect’ based hierarchies that are the epitome of violent potential and illicit 
entrepreneurialism.  Interestingly, both men use the term ‘affiliated’, which denotes that 
enforcers are often part of a wide network of criminal operators.  For John, being incarcerated 
can contribute towards developing criminal affiliations, which supports Rahman’s (2019, 
p.124) claim that the ‘institutionalised’ form of street capital ‘is much needed for one to be 
legitimated in the eyes of those who are embedded in the underworld’. 
While respect is imperative for cultivating a reputable identity as well as an entrée in 
underworld settings, the relational and occupational aspects of social embeddedness is worthy 
of consideration.  Two Scottish enforcers, ‘Wi’ and ‘Ge’, discussed this concept when 
reflecting on how they fell into this line of work: 
 
Wi: I don’t think I had a precious way in which I fell into it. 
Ge: Nah, wouldn’t say so 
Wi: I had always had backing from dodgy guys. It was well known, [so I] had always 
been a bit brazen about the scheme… fact actually the first time I got paid was wee 
[Jason]. Gave me £5. 
Ge: (laughing) and a bottle of Bucky 
Wi: (laughs) mind his slasher cap [also] 
Ge: Aye, after words. 
Interviewer: What was that for? 
Wi: £5, a bottle of B, and a cap to batter fuck right out of [young gang member]. I 
didn’t like him either but.  
 
At the age of 14, Wi had been a core member of a local youth gang. As such, another 
member paid him a small fee to sort an ongoing dispute. Coincidently, this individual would 
also later pay Wi again to carry out a more serious offence on the individual’s brother-in-law, 
still unknown to his partner. As Wi’s reputation grew, so did the opportunities afforded him:  
 
 … aye, we just hung out in [southside area]. My mates’ mate, [mate A] said some 
guy fucked his auld man over … [I suggested that we go] to [the guy’s] house. My 
mate chapped his door, the maw came out so I fuckin’ gubbed (punched) her right in 




































































laughing). Everybody was scrapping outside the boy’s house (laughs)…. [afterwards] 
I glanced a missed call … [returning the call a voice] answer (Mate A’s dad) said 
“cheers”, stick up for him ... Asked us round … [after several meetings] we were in 
[mate A’s] drinking [and his dad] asked to speak to me… said “you want a wee job eh 
lad?”. Always called me lad. Course, I’m fucking steaming, said aye, “what’s it 
doing” … [he asked me] to do some guy in round on [street name] ... gave me the 
address on a bit of paper, said tell “no cunt lad. Destroy that” (Wi motions tapping 
paper) … [I] steak[ed] the place out a bit. Knowing his routine, that, you know… [one 
night he] was coming [down lane C], back from [pub name], only two ways back to 
his …. I had been waiting in the bushes. They (the bushes) run up the side of the wall 
(demonstrating with hands) … no chance [would] get clocked. The street light shines 
across the building so its pitch dark. [the victim always] used the side door whenever 
going back from work. I assumed he would do the same … I came up behind him 
before he put key in the door, just torn the knife along his face like that (gesturing 
horizontal motion). He was fuckin’ wrecked, didn’t scream, nothing … So, I plugged 
him in the back and bailed … [I received] £750. Was paid about a month, 5 weeks 
later. 
 
As Wi states, while he had a criminal reputation locally and had already received a 
payment at the tender age of 14 for conducting an assault, how he received his first ‘proper’ 
payment for a ‘hit’ was quite different. Then, six months later, Mate A’s dad again 
approached Wi and asked him to go for ‘a drive’: 
 
Was just cruzin. I didn’t think nothing other than he was wanting to talk shit … he 
smacks the breaks, shouts “that’s the cunts”, pulls the car on the other side of the road 
and hands me a massive KD (abbreviated for kitchen devil) … [I] ran up behind the 
guy [and] grabbed his jacket collar … stabbed him rapid as fuck all over the body … 
mainly the back … must have been about 20 times … don’t know how many stabs 
went through the jacket, no’ that sure … fucking bailed …. I didn’t even ask for 
anything. Crazy man, I knew nothing. Out driving next thing fucking GBH on some 
dude I’ve never clocked before … [Mate A’s dad] did that (motions with his hand), 
put about £340, no £45 (£345) up my sleeve.  
 
Like legitimate activities, illicit activities are hard to separate from social relations 
between participants and the institutional environment in which interactions take place.  
Regularly the term “partners in crime” is used to describe relationships that are bound by 
established social ties.  Therefore, crime is habitually embedded in existing friendship, 




































































strong internal relationships based on trust.  As there is no protection from opportunistic 
behaviour, offenders prefer working with or for individuals that they have established ties 
with.  John’s involvement in enforcement started after he was approached by a “school mate” 
who worked for an OC group.  It was his school friend who introduced him to the criminal 
group:    
 
Because of my law enforcement and private investigator backgrounds, they knew 
that I had methods and techniques of tracking people down and finding out in-depth 
information about people.  I’m not justifying what I’ve done, but at that time I 
needed the money and therefore I’d be the person that certain individuals would 
rely on when it came to offering strong intel on someone who owed money and 
what not.  But then I got greedy.  The money was coming in nicely and I got myself 
involved more and more to the extent whereby I’d go on knocks and be on the front 
line. So from being offered a grand or two to provide accurate information on a 
person, my role became more expensive and more hands-on.    
 
While it was relational embeddedness that facilitated John to get involved in 
underworld activities, it was his occupational embeddedness that supported him to occupy a 
niche position within enforcement.  Most OC activities that are sophisticated or continuous 
require reliable information.  Often, criminals achieve this by using corrupt law enforcement 
agents, as their occupation serves as a source for intelligence.  According to Van de Bunt et 
al. (2014: p.327-328), in some circumstances ‘the link between organised crime and 
occupations is easily explained: certain occupations provide their practitioners with ideal 
opportunities to engage in organised crime’.   
The work of Benson et al. (2009) offers a threefold explanation of how certain 
occupations provide opportunity to commit crimes.  They first consider nodes; how social 
contacts established through the course of a career can contribute towards criminality.  
Alongside occupational networks, they consider paths; how individuals follow established 
procedures, and how they find certain people to achieve the right goals.  Finally, they 




































































crimes.  This often occurs when activities are insufficiently supervised.  In John’s case, it can 
be said that his opportunity to be involved in enforcement stemmed from being connected by 
an established social contact, who realised that his prior occupations in law enforcement were 
valuable, so as to be able to “achieve the right goals”.  However, Aaron’s opportunity to 
become an enforcer was a combination of node and edges: 
 
I first got involved when I was working on a few nightclub doors.  This one 
doorman approached me and knew that I could handle myself.  He also knew that I 
worked at the gym so he asked whether I’d be interested in making some additional 
money through debt collecting.  It was as simple as that.  He reassured me that there 
was minimal risk attached to jobs and I went for it.  Basically, for a while, I was an 
enforcer in the morning and a doorman at night.  
 
The above passage reveals how certain legitimate occupations like nightclub 
security encompass individuals who are involved in extra-legal governance, particularly 
in relation to the provision of a service – debt collecting – which has previously been 
criticised for being unregulated even in a legitimate context (Verkaik 2000).  Put simply, 
occupations in some cases can serve as a breeding ground for criminal activities.  Crimes 
like enforcement will take on the shape of a social environment, and those who become 
enforcers are often the product of an expanding network through social ties. 
 
The Economics of Enforcement  
The understanding of money being the keystone asset for offenders extends beyond OC 
studies.  Gary Becker’s (1968) work on the economic approach of crime and punishment 
examined how offenders calculate; the practicalities of earning legal income, the income 
offered because of such opportunities, the income received based on illicit methods, the 




































































the offender be caught.  A swathe of economic studies of crime has emerged since Becker’s 
seminal work.   
Most academic work that considers offenders who operate in criminal enterprises for 
monetary gain emphasize the rationality of perpetrators as well as their ability to maximize 
their operations subject to constraints (Reuter 1983; Fiorentini & Peltzman 1997; Allum & 
Glimour 2012; Densley 2013; Hobbs 2013; Abadinsky 2016).  However, Bakkali’s (2019) 
pioneering research on road life in London, UK, argues how economic capital on road can be 
entrenched in the form of cultural capital (an individual’s embodied, linguistic, objectified 
and institutionalised state) and social capital (the networks that individuals are connected to) 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  Likewise, a person’s social and cultural capitals can be institutionalised in 
the form of economic capital.  John emphasised how “debt collecting works by 
name”.  When asked how contact would be made for a debt collecting service, he alludes to 
the significance of social and cultural capital:   
 
For instance, if an individual who lives in the West Midlands is owed money by 
someone in the North East; regardless of criminal or business reasons, one of the 
first things that would happen is a dialogue between a big name in the West 
Midlands and someone that he knows in the North East. Sometimes a conversation 
between individuals can settle a lot of things.  The bigger the name, the less 
violence is employed.  So, the chances of that debt being collected is relatively high 
because mutual agreements can be made.  If you’re a household name in the 
criminal underworld, that alone gets half of the job done. 
 
John’s perspective of enforcement on a regional level illustrates the dialectical relationship 
between social and cultural capitals in the underworld and its significance for economic gain 
for the lender as well as the enforcer.  Like most underworld activities, debt collecting is a 
rarified niche in the labour market, which is seemingly contingent upon social ties.  While 
Bourdieu (1986: p.247) defines social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of institutionalised 




































































measured.  Seemingly, for John, social capital in extra-legal duties hinges on “a household 
name in the criminal underworld”.  Although he does not offer insight on how a name is 
amassed within the illicit realm, he reinforces a recurring theme in this study thus far, which 
is that reputation is crucial in the criminal landscape.   
In addition, John stresses the importance of a “dialogue” taking place and alludes to 
how a “conversation” between operatives can mitigate victimisation and the procuring of 
outstanding finances.  Evidently this reinforces Bourdieu’s (1990) understanding of linguistic 
cultural capital, which argues that the mastery of language, speech and its relations, that is a 
person’s means of communication and self-presentation, is acquired from the national 
culture.  In this case, the culture that the dialogue is acquired from may involve prior 
successful interactions with nefarious individuals as well as engagement in illicit goods or 
services.  
At a house party in Glasgow, for example, a discussion ensued in which Wi would 
disclose his activities vaguely to a reputable OC group. One of the group’s members later 
contacted Wi and asked if he would be willing to “do a few things” in return for payment. 
The pay fluctuated depending on the job, but Wi would agree or disagree to the terms if he 
needed the money, if he was not busy, and if the job would not take too long. On some 
occasions, he did not even ask for money because the gang gave him “cheap” and 
occasionally “free” drugs. Wi felt he was part of the group and that he “owed” them, but with 
hindsight he knows he was really being exploited: 
 
Wi: To be honest mate, they just use people. Like vulnerable wee guys wi’ 
[reputations] from the scheme. End up thinking “aye they are cool” cause they are 
giving you [drugs], aye, whatever …. They do back you up [also though if] I was to 
get in trouble. Makes it hard, know, if you’re being used or not really …. They would 
fling me under a bus if it came to it [however]. That’s why they get wee guys to do 
shite for them. Shit falls on them if they get caught. 
Ge: That’s in the contract but mate. You get paid.  





































































For Aaron and John in England, by contrast, enforcement is very much a monetary-
driven service, which is rewarding. As Aaron states: 
 
In debt collecting sometimes you find that the lender will tell you to get back his 
money and from that, you get a percentage.  I’ve been involved in situations 
whereby individuals have had to pay back the money with interest.  In them cases 
I’ve been told by the lender to take a percentage from the money that he’s owed and 
whatever else he’s charged on top.  But these kinds of things you agree before you 
go and do the job and you first assess how big the job is.  
 
 
John’s stance on costing is much firmer.  Seemingly, his cost is contingent upon the 
value of the debt as opposed to the severity of recovering the outstanding money: 
 
For me, it depended on the size of the debt.  If it was a debt below £20,000 it’d be 
20% of whatever I’m told to recover as opposed to what I end up recovering.  If it’s 
a big job, then I would ask for a flat fee for £10,000.  Especially if it’s a flat fee and 
work out of town, a collection that’s six figures. I’d ask nothing less than ten grand.  
 
While both men differ on how they justify the economics of their work, they both echo that 
costing is agreed prior to commencing any extra-legal work.  Interestingly, their perceptions of 
costing differ from Becker’s (1968) viewpoint of how offenders calculate the economics of 
their crime. Both men do not factor the probability of being apprehended in their costing, nor 
do they decide the monetary value of their work in relation to the punishment that they would 
receive if convicted.  This should not be mistaken for imprudent behaviour, as the next section 
reveals that the men are indeed rational and sophisticated in their planning and execution of 
extra-legal work. 
 
Planning and Execution 
Based on the above, social ties are crucial, as offenders operate in volatile 




































































similarities between legal and illegal activities, especially within OC settings, it should be 
stressed that illegality does make a difference when it comes to how an activity takes place.  
By default, illegality insinuates that contracts are not enforceable.  This denotes that illegal 
actions must be clandestine, as people can be arrested and their assets can be seized at any 
given point.  The concept of OC is nebulous, yet it is globally accepted that the phenomenon 
is financially lucrative.  There is little by way of guidelines and mechanisms that govern 
transactions in the underworld.  For instance, entering a contract and paying off debts add to 
the everlasting list of unregulated actions in the illicit world, hence cooperation in the world 
of organised criminality can be problematic.  Thus, cooperation is paramount.   
Aaron, who has previously worked as a debt collector on a freelance basis for several 
underworld figures, reflects on the rational nature of debt collecting, a process which in 
popular culture is synonymous to violent practice, but one that he considers to be complex: 
 
You see, something like debt collecting is not about inflicting violence.  A lot of it 
is about approach.  Sometimes it’s about how you talk and how you can go about 
handling an intense situation.  Often I’ve observed a lot of doormen that are 
employed as debt collectors.  I’ve even worked with a few.  They’re usually 
involved because they’ve got the gift of the gab.  They can talk their way through 
situations but at the same time they’re usually big and therefore intimidating. 
 
Interestingly, Aaron’s experiences of debt collecting involve working alongside 
nightclub doormen.   His sentiments echo the work of Hobbs et al. (2005), whose 
ethnographic research revealed how licit and illicit opportunities are often presented to private 
security, which usually come in the daunting form of “bouncers”.  Although Aaron makes it 
clear that violence for him is not a defining function when it comes to enforcing debt 
collection, he does consider intimidation to be a crucial characteristic.  His perspective 
supports Schloenhardt’s (1999) research findings of how actors in trafficking organisations 




































































illegal enterprises.  When Aaron was prompted to expand on his thoughts about employing 
violence when debt collecting, he stated:  
 
… you have to approach these things with a bit of sense.  If you’re out to collect 
money, you need to have a feel of the person that you’re going to deal with.  
Remember, they can just end up going to the police.  What you’re doing isn’t 
legal, because after all what you’re doing is intimidating them and you are kind 
of putting the feelers out.  It depends on the situation.  Debt collecting is different 
to say beating someone up. 
 
Based on the above, Aaron is prudent of the illegalities of debt collecting via 
enforcement.  Similarly, to him, Theo is wary of employing violence, especially when dealing 
with debtors that are not from criminal backgrounds:  
 
I’ve been part of situations where it’s been a ‘criminal figure’ so to speak, that dealt 
with a legitimate company who owed him money.  So, in that case I didn’t go in 
with tools (weapons).  It’s because I was dealing with normal 9 to 5 people, who 
would happily call the police.  So, you’re better off reasoning with them and having 
a conversation.  But I suppose if you’re dealing with those that are involved in OC 
so to speak, then there would be no police involvement and therefore you’d send a 
message in a different way, and maybe that could be through the use of weapons.  
It’s about knowing who you’re dealing with, but most importantly it’s about how 
you’re able to get that money back.   
 
Seemingly, Theo’s approach towards the use of violence is contingent upon the 
operating position of the debtor.  Indeed, enforcement, in relation to debt collecting is not a 
process that is exclusive to underworld operatives.  His approach of “reasoning” with 
legitimate figures implies logic as well as rationality, which is much needed when retrieving 
owed money.   
However, his perspective on employing violence differs with those from OC settings.  
While there is no primary evidence to support this statement, it seems that Theo’s viewpoint 
of no police involvement observes the notion of omerta, which means that those from criminal 




































































carry out or ones that are carried out against them.  Research that considers omerta reveals 
how organised criminals are not in a position to ask for law enforcement protection, nor are 
they able to initiate civil action when they have been exploited (Reuter 1983; Gambetta 1996; 
Paoli 2002; Zaitch 2005).  In addition, Theo’s involvement in enforcement has required him 
to collect money from a legitimate company on behalf of a criminal.  This is a prime example 
of “blurred boundaries”, which is an ongoing discussion in studies of OC that considers how 
interactions between licit and illicit worlds are often fluid.  When prompted as to why 
business owners would require the help of those part of criminal organisations, Theo stated: 
 
You’ll find that legit businesses have ties with individuals that are in the underworld 
when it comes to assets like property, cars and other things.  Also, businessmen 
work with other businessmen and sometimes they need enforcers to settle an issue 
in order to avoid court fees, legal fees and other issues that will cause hassle or 
economic strain.  So therefore, you’d go to a man and say “I got an issue, can you 
deal with it?” 
 
The above excerpt resonates with Aaron’s experiences as an enforcer on one occasion: 
 
One case that I was involved in was because this guy started up a coffee shop in 
town and he took out some credit.  Legit business of course but the guy owed 
£15,000.  In this case, I think things were done legally, as there was paperwork 
and signatures involved, but the lender didn’t want to take it to court and end up 
with the hassle of paying legal fees.  So, I had to go down and speak to this guy 
respectfully and ask him where are we at with the repayments etc. 
 
Both Aaron and Theo mention the instrumental value of enforcement.  In the Western 
world, financial disputes are often settled through legal channels, which therefore involves 
judicial processes that are costly.  The instrumental value in enforcement is that individuals 
like Aaron and Theo help one achieve a particular end.  In doing so, they become arbiters of 
an alternative form of criminal justice.  Both men’s experiences depict the commodification 




































































profitability.  Aaron stated that he viewed his time as an enforcer as ‘employment, because at 
the end of the day it’s all about being paid’.  Similarly, Theo viewed his role as enforcer as a 
‘job’ that involved ‘getting paid’.  By rationalising enforcement as a method of occupation, as 
opposed to a criminal act, both men have employed rationality and sophistication, so as to be 
able to continuously offer a service that is a rarefied niche in the criminal market.  John, who 
has worked alongside professional enforcers demonstrates rationality and sophistication when 
planning and executing an act of enforcement: 
I’ve collected in many cities between Glasgow, Scotland and London, England.  I 
used to work for a guy who lived in southern Spain, and he would often get me 
involved in jobs.  But there was a pattern when it came to debt collecting.  The 
knock itself is probably 20-30 minutes max.  But the preparation for it is weeks.  If 
done correctly, you’d have to establish who’s the debtor? What are they capable of?  
Can the debt be collected?  How much can be collected?  Who is the debtor linked 
to?  Can we come to a compromise? Are we wasting our time here?  What other 
information do we have?  What school do their kids go to?  Can we get easy access 
to his wife or girlfriend? 
 
As mentioned, John’s involvement in enforcement is unconventional.  Evidently, 
John takes an intelligence approach when operating alongside professional enforcers.  
The above excerpt not only demonstrates rationality and sophistication, but it also 
unearths the underpinning acts that are crucial for the successful planning and execution 
of a debt collection.  Given John’s expertise, one may think his method is an exception, 
however, Aaron also stated that “a vetting process of the debtor is important”, while 
Theo put forward how enforcement “is all about knowing who you’re dealing with”.   
  
Some of the stories from Scotland highlight why vetting is so important. Wi was 
once hired by an Edinburgh-based crime group to assault one of its own group 
members. Wi took the job, even though it was outside of his comfort zone, and recruited 





































































Wi: Fuck that am fucking going places, fucking don’t know place. Meeting fucking 
guys, I don’t fucking know.  
Ge: I said to him [once he told me], “am fucking going mate”.  
Wi: Aye, did… was fucking dodgy mate, aye. We are out in a scrap yard. Well no’ 
really. Like an industrial estate, [partly demolished]. Middle of nowhere. These guys 
come up in a [car type] … I thought they would have Edinburgh accent, but they were 
[Glaswegians].  
Ge: Nah mate, I think I’ve seen the tall yin. I am sure he is from Dundee…. [they] 
gave us an address, said have it done by the night… went to [house A] …. Fucking 
didn’t even know where it was.  
Wi (laughing) walked it using sat nav. 
Ge: I chapped the door. About ten times before he answered. 
Wi: Well [he] didn’t answer, but was speaking through the door. The glass panel you 
see. Mumbling shit.  
Ge: Wouldn’t answer, [so Wi] fucking pans the window wi’ a boulder from the boy’s 
front yard (laughs). 
Wi: Fucking guy’s holding on for life. Like jamming his body against the door.  
 
After several attempts to enter the property in an effort to assault the individual in 
question, the would-be victim managed to fend off his assailants. Wi and Ge were forced to 
leave because the commotion was attracting too much attention and this failure pretty much 
sounded the death knell for his enforcement career.  
Also in Scotland, Joe survived a hit because, like the group who hired Wi and Ge, his 
enemies had hired the wrong man for the job: 
 
Open[ed] front door and this guy’s just pure standing there … didn’t know what he 
was doing. Was fumbling about, going through his jacket, twitching…. [eventually] 
this big blade falls on the floor… I took the axe off the wall and chased him '… he ran 
into [rival group member’s] car. I knew it was them straight away. Paying a junkie to 
do me in.’ 
 
In this case, the hitman was a drug addict (“junkie”) who had been manipulated into 
the deed. Wi also talked about this practice: 
 
Mostly [youths that are] used, [or] fucking junkies… you do get like high level 
guys… they usually have like [paramilitary experience]… they would only be used 
for like high shit to get to guys that no one else can get to … yeah, I’ve been given a 




































































professional know. Anyone can shoot a gun [but] hard to aim them. You wouldn’t 
think it but hitting targets isn’t easy. 
 
While Wi discussed earlier that he regularly used weapons, such as knives, to carry 
out enforcement, the use of firearms indicated a new level, which he was unwilling to 
progress to, largely due to inexperience. Former soldier Matt, an ex-offender recently turned 
practitioner, discussed his prior involvement in criminal networks and how military and 
professional experience may often play an important role in the higher echelons of 
enforcement.  
 
[Anyone] could get a gun if they really pure tried. Would likely be of poor quality… 
[or] more likely lack the proper ammunition [however]. Most [firearms used aren’t] 
like gun guns … [they are typically] replicas, air rifles, modified pieces with 
reactivated firing pins … antiquates … Bullets are usually cut to fit. Need the 
knowhow to get guns with the proper ammunition …. [ammo] is overlooked by the 
run of the mill guy. When I [left the army] I had connections … [I was] approached 
from time to time … [asked] what could I get my hands on. Punters can be flipped off 
wi’ a pirate (antique revolver with modified ammunition). They just want to look 
flash [to say] “I have a gun, back up”. I knew [when someone was a] serious geezer 
… [I usually] knew … or knew of … the boys that [approached me] on behalf [of the 
OCG].   
 
Matt notes the importance access to firearms, and their proper discharge, plays in the 
social structuring of criminal networks. Once Matt left the army, he was approached by local 
criminals whom he had shared childhood experiences with. They would enquire as to whether 
Matt could use established military connections to obtain firearms for them in exchange for 
an agreed fee. Over time, Matt would gain a reputation as someone with connections. With 
this reputation Matt would occasionally be approached by criminal groups involved in the 
higher echelons of OC. Interaction would usually be facilitated, not by key members of the 
OCG themselves, but rather other, usually known, individuals who like Matt had prior 
(para)military experience. These individuals could draw upon existing knowledge and 




































































of detail, insight and professional experience often separates low-mid level enforcers, such as 
Wi, from more serious offenders. This can be as simple as knowing how to actually load and 
discharge a firearm, as Matt states: 
 
See wi’ handguns you can stand there, me here, pure unloading clips on each other 
[and] hit everything in the room but each other. 
 
Mistakes such as these can result in ‘civies’ (civilians) getting caught in the cross fire 
or collateral damage in the form of partners, friends and family members being unduly 
assaulted.  
Irrespective of rationalising enforcement as employment, Aaron, John, and Theo are 
mindful that the act itself is criminal and punishable by imprisonment.  With this in mind, the 
men are cautious of enforcement, with Aaron stressing that debt collecting must be 
approached “with a bit of sense”.  Similarly, Theo highlights the importance of “reasoning”, 
while John provides a detailed example of executing an act of enforcement: 
 
Debt collecting and being an enforcer is a shady business.  Long gone are the days 
whereby you could trust people that you’d work with.  Now it’s all about greed.  
Now with technology on everyone, every day, you don’t know who’s monitoring 
or recording your nefarious and criminally driven conversations.  One example I 
can give involved myself and a well-known figure in the East Midlands.  We were 
on a job which involved a lot of money that needed to be collected.  Me and this 
guy turned up to the debtor’s house and I did all the talking.  I said to the man: 
“Hello, I’m here on behalf of the individual who you owe money to.  I don’t know 
much about what’s gone on between you and the lender but what I can say is that 
you should pay the man his money back because it’s the moral and right thing to 
do.  I really don’t want to be disturbing family time with you and I apologise if I’ve 
done so, but let’s just settle this as gentlemen”.  Now while I’ve said all this, the 
man next to me is holding a sign which reads out as: “We know you’re recording 
us.  Don’t make a scene or else we’ll make it difficult for you to breathe”’.  Do you 
see what I mean?  If this guy now goes to the police and makes a statement saying 
that I threatened him, I’ll counter by making the police listen to what I had to say 







































































The focus of our research has been to address the relative paucity of scholarly insights 
into the pathways into criminal enforcement, the nuanced roles undertaken by enforcers that 
often exist on a continuum, and the relationship between these men’s activity, the wider 
context of OC and presence of social and cultural capital within it (Bourdieu, 1985, 1986, 
1990). As such, in this paper we have drawn upon a comparative micro-analysis of the 
narratives of three men in West Scotland and three men in West Midlands, respectively, as a 
means of providing an initial, exploratory understanding of these issues from the perspective 
of those hard-to-reach individuals who are immersed in extra-legal undertakings. By 
presenting their voices, we have sought to present real-world insights into the often 
misunderstood and not well-captured lives of active enforcers. In so doing, we have been able 
to provide personal viewpoints, examples and anecdotes from those men who have been 
successful and less successful in their endeavours. This, we believe, speaks well to the 
structure of the illicit business of enforcement in different geographical, cultural and 
historical locations.  
In our initial literature review, we drew upon previous scholarly insights to 
distinguish between the wider, macro- presence of enforcement and the more micro- focus on 
contract killings. We identified the evidence that suggests the way in which organised 
criminals often outsource threats, intimidation and violence as a means of insulating 
themselves from the negative consequences of this activity and that – at times – this 
outsourcing process may include the need for contract killing (Schloenhardt 1999; MacIntyre 
et al. 2014; Wilson & Rahman 2015; Brolan et al. 2016). We also focused on the blurring of 
boundaries between occupational roles and criminal enforcement and the (albeit limited) 
evidence in the literature on OC that suggests a spectrum of enforcement roles and activities 




































































relatively smoothly, without retort to violence. In relation to the more extreme end of 
enforcement roles, we also critiqued the previous typologies that suggest the nuanced nature 
of ‘hitmen’ characteristics, which may often include the presence of ‘dilettantes’ and 
‘journeymen’ as well as more professional ‘masters’ (Schlesinger 2001; MacIntyre et al. 
2014).  
As we have alluded to, the Midlands areas of England have historically been 
renowned for the presence of criminal groups (Rahman 2019), and the men we interviewed 
there clearly had many years of licit and illicit occupational roles behind them. Contrastingly, 
although some high profile underworld figures and families have been notoriously associated 
with the criminal history of Glasgow (Scotland’s largest city), in a more general sense the 
West of Scotland has traditionally been more renowned for its territorial street gang culture 
(Deuchar, 2009; Davies, 2013), albeit that recent evidence has suggested emerging links 
between this and the wider work of OC groups (McLean 2019). The traditionally different 
historical, cultural and geographical contexts that surrounded the men we interviewed 
perhaps in some ways gave rise to the subtly differing insights and perspectives that arose in 
our data. 
While men like John, Aaron and Theo traditionally worked on the basis of clearly 
defined and carefully negotiated financial fees that preceded enforcement activity, those in 
the West of Scotland were at times less proactive and due to their younger age and reduced 
prior experience, they could feel exploited by those who recruited them (see also Deuchar 
2018; Mclean et al. 2019).  Although a level of rationality was usually present across both of 
our sites, and enforcement acts were always predicated on the presence of both social and 
cultural capital, the latter appeared more deeply embedded within the perspectives of the men 
in the West Midlands due to their deeply relational and also occupational embeddedness 




































































into the categories of ‘amateurs’, ‘dilettantes’ and ‘journeymen’ (MacIntyre et al., 2014); 
while their roles were clearly wider than those associated with professional ‘hitmen’ 
(involving violence that stopped short of killing), they were also prone to a lack of careful 
planning and the making of mistakes. Those in the West Midlands evidently also engaged in 
more nuanced roles beyond the use of contract killing or even violence, including the need 
for rational approaches to debt collection and acting as arbiters of alternative justice with 
those involved in both legitimate and illegitimate businesses.  However, their more advanced 
levels of advantageous occupational experience, social embeddedness and related ability to 
draw upon appropriate nodes, paths and edges (Benson et al., 2009) illustrated the importance 
of advanced cultural and institutional street capital in successfully entering, advancing and 
navigating the terrain associated with OC as recognised professional enforcers.  
Our research suggests that nuanced enforcement roles may be deeply woven into the 
fabric of organised criminality within some parts of the UK, yet it is a criminal activity that is 
overlooked in policy and national debates (HM Government, 2018).  While we must be 
cautious about overgeneralizing the insights from our qualitative research, the findings could 
help to inform the future work of UK law enforcement in tackling the issue of OC and the 
work of enforcers within this context. 
For example, in the West Midlands Police and Crime Plan 2016-2020, the West 
Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner (2016, p.13) makes the link between OC and 
‘urban street gangs’ and focuses on the need for ‘detecting, disrupting and bringing 
perpetrators to justice’ (p.14). Our research, albeit small-scale in nature, suggests that those 
who define themselves as enforcers may not always be directly associated with urban street 
gangs but may have occupational roles that enhance their ability to become recruited by 
organised criminals and rely on strong reputational profiling to ensure repeat business and 




































































that engaged in extra-legal encounters that had descriptions of complex interactions.   John’s 
time as an enforcer epitomises how reputation and a tactful approach to violence as opposed 
to its application can be sufficient to coerce a wrongdoer.  Indeed, theorists have long 
recognised the importance of the connection between power and reputation.  As Thomas 
Hobbes once claimed, ‘The reputation of power is power: because it draweth with it the 
adherence of those that need protection’ (Hobbes 1651 in Oakeshott 1947: p.56).  The 
Commissioner also makes reference to the need for reducing gun and knife crime and for 
increasing the volume of ‘weapon surrender bins’ in relevant boroughs and communities 
(p.14). However, our insights illustrate the way in which killing, and even wider, non-lethal 
violence, is only one element of an enforcer’s role and that planning and execution may 
equally involve logic, rationality, careful use of verbal communication and intelligence-led 
approaches arising from prior occupational knowledge.  
In Scotland, Police Scotland (2016) has identified that its service faces ‘significant 
demand’ in respect of investigations into OC, and in its national strategy for reducing the 
harm caused by it, the Scottish Government (2015) presents a four-pronged approach: divert 
people from OC; deter OC groups; detect and prosecute people involved in OC; and disrupt 
OC groups. The data outlined in this paper suggest that discussion, debate and strategic 
decision-making around OC enforcement should be further guided by insights into the 
potential exploitation of young men, the nuanced nature of the enforcement roles they may 
take on, and the risks they can become subjected to due to their relative inexperience in 
undertaking these roles.  
At the same time, we believe that further research is needed into the extent to and 
ways in which men of all ages and from differing social and occupational background may 
become attracted to, recruited for and gain traction through, enforcement roles within 




































































focus on exploring and examining the potential links between occupational backgrounds in 
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Dear Reviewer and Editor-in-Chief, 
 
RE: TIOC-D-19-00046: Who are the enforcers? The motives and methods of muscle for hire 
in West Scotland and the West Midlands 
  
We thank you for recognizing ‘significant merit’ in our work and the opportunity to revise 
and resubmit our article for considered publication in Trends in Organized Crime.  Based 
on the feedback provided, we have expended considerable time and effort in making a 
number of substantive changes to the manuscript. The following is a detailed statement of 




I think that at first there needs to be a better conceptual consideration about enforcing 
agreements in criminal marketplaces and in situation where agents often co-operate, but where 
trust may be limited.  There is little discussion around the social norms, and how these might 
govern and sustained by agents.  In many ways we regard criminal marketplaces as inherently 
violent, often they are not.  How does enforcement fit within this?   
 
We agree that the original manuscript took for granted the need for enforcement in 
criminal settings. We have rewritten the literature review to provide greater context and 
explore the nuances of criminal marketplaces. We further explore this in the findings.  
 
Quickly (indeed in the abstract) enforcers seem to be conflated into Hitmen? Are they?  Here is 
the core problem for me, we really never have the parameters around what is being described 
'enforcement' or muscle for hire' properly established? Quickly the article simply conflates 
enforcement with muscle for hire, and then with paid contract homicide.  I think you need a more 
focused engagement with the extended literature on organised crime and a better connection with 
the dark, violent aspect that constitutes some of it.  But that some might be a minority activity at 
the very bottom of the social strata where legal redress is not available.  I think this needs to be 
better established at the outset and throughout.  This is there at page 4, but the counterpoint, that 
most criminal transactions run relatively smoothly without retort to violence also needs to be 
acknowledged and the whole terminology of 'enforcement' unpacked a bit more in an academic 
manner.  We never really establish what the authors mean by enforcement (or muscle for hire) 
and we have no real definition or parameters set around what is being described beyond taken for 
granted stereotypes. If we are talking about people outsourcing their capacity for physical 
violence and intimidation, we need a better introduction and framing of that setting up some 
better parameters than the ill defined ones here.  In this respect I can see how violence can be 
core, and instrumental violence again runs a continuum, and yet I do not think lethal violence is 
that central, and really think much of the hitmen connection a bit overdone. Is there not a huge 
difference between say a small act of debt collecting and a paid contract murder.  How can we 
justify placing those together.  Instramental use of criminal violence for example is there in a 
robbery or in taking pay to burn out a building.  Is this enforcement?    
 
Response to Reviewer Comments (must not contain author
information)
This is an important observation. We have completely rewritten the front end of the paper 
(the abstract, introduction, and literature review) to disentangle “hitmen” from other 
enforcers and to present a continuum of enforcement. We offer a clear definition for the 
concept of enforcement and, in so doing, better set up the contribution of the current study.  
 
The article abstract mentions men.  The interview Scotland sample featured men and women?   
 
In the revised methodology, we have clarified that this study is based on an all-male 
subsample of a broader ethnographic study of organized criminals that included women. 
Our focus here is only people who identified principally as “enforcers” as opposed to drug 
dealers etc.  
 
I Was left wondering why were these research sites selected? We are not told in the methods.  
Traditionally the West coast line was perhaps a first manifestation of county lines, is this a 
reason for the selected sites.  Why the comparative dimension?   
 
We have added a full paragraph on how and why the sites were chosen and why a 
comparative analysis is appropriate.  
 
I found the methods section a bit odd.  I have the feeling this is material gathered for another 
purpose now being re-interpreted.  This is fine, but in all, and digging down we are talking about 
some six or seven people who appear in the article.  This would seem a small sample to be 
making broader claims about enforcement practices. The methodology feel a bit opaque, and 
simple description of ethical approval is no substitute for a more detailed discussion of 
participant involvement and understanding of the research process.  Given the nature of the topic, 
what were participants understandings of agreement and consent?   How long were they known 
for?  How can you place stock in what you are told?   With interventions like that of Steven 
Lubet in Interrogating Ethnography who precisely with this sort of ethnography suggests a field 
that relies heavily on anonymous sources, often as reported by a single investigator whose 
underlying data remain unseen and alleges too many ethnographic assertions that were dubious, 
exaggerated, tendentious, or just plain wrong, ethnographers should be giving a better account of 
their methods than appears here.  That would need amending in my view before any publication.  
It may be possible to look to how others have done this, but I found a few lines on this under the 
heading Methods to be wholly insufficient.  
 
We acknowledge that the methodology needed more detail and have made changes to this 
effect. However, some of these criticisms, namely how the veracity of our (sample’s) claims 
can be trusted, could be levelled at literally any qualitative study, especially of hard to 
reach, hidden populations. Owing to space constraints, we cannot answer all of them in 
text. What we can say here is – and as mentioned in the manuscript – all participants went 
through informed consent and voluntarily answered all questions and prompts.  In 
addition, to avoid unethical practice, participants were counselled to reveal their personal 
information or talk about any ongoing criminal activities that they are directly or 
indirectly related to. Given that the manuscript is for a journal article, word count is 
restricted and therefore we believe that all relevant details have been addressed in relation 
to the mechanics of the primary research.   
 
 
Moving on from this, there is a debate to be had about the very truth claims being made of such a 
small sample of interviewees.  For example, many of those presented here talk of their rep, but 
really, do debt collectors, a six foot guy or two with a face full of scars built like a brick wall 
really need a criminal name or reputation to effectively settle scores and collect money from 
someone?  Is there an element here of posturing?  Interestingly this is partially answered in the 
section on the economics of enforcement, which I think needs to be acknowledged earlier and 
before the empirical argument is made (much more relevant to me than the hitman arguments).  
On the point that reputation is key in the criminal underworld that seems to be a central strand of 
the argument here, is that really still the case.  That jars a little with say Criminal identities and 
consumer culture: crime, exclusion and the new culture of narcissism or articles linked by hall, 
Winlow and Ancrum (take for example little Legs lament on the decline of the established 
underworld hierarchy where anyone with a big blade or a gun can settle scores) or indeed, Hobbs 
later work in lush life that sees the global as quite transformative (and certainly democratising) a 
feature that seems to appear in page 27 in Theo's quote for example.  Finally, this also links to 
the observations on the continuum and line that seemingly may exist between legal debt 
collecting and debt collecting and score settling its illicit forms (a line I feel much more central 
than say hitmen) which comes in later in the argument and perhaps needs to be a central thrust, I 
feel there is far more value in this.  Specific debt collection companies legal and regulated into a 
darker manifestation involving the likes of Shaun Smith. Perhaps here the problem is the lack of 
clarity on what enforcement is that the authors demonstrate.  If I hire a hard man to batter a rival, 
is that enforcement?  Is muscle hired to run with the Cannabis being imported 'enforcement'?  
Where does door work or bouncing fit?  Is that enforcement?  The piece makes mention of the 
relative paucity of scholarly insights into criminal enforcement, but by the conclusion we really 
still have not established what criminal enforcement is.  The empirical material presented here is 
fascinating, but without connection to a strong theoretical and underpinning context framing 
argument it all feels underdeveloped.  When the researchers thus claim 'while we must be 
cautious of overgeneralising the insights of our qualitative research' it feels a little like they are 
closing the door after the horse has bolted.  What it needs is a better framing of the entirety of the 
argument around what enforcement is, with the empirical material marshalled in that direction. If 
that was here I might feel differently, but as it stands, and with the lack of focus on methods and 
ethics, I think it needs substantial restructuring. 
 
We take issue with some of these criticisms because (a) they seem to be grounded in the 
very same myths that the current study aims to challenge (‘do debt collectors, a six foot guy 
or two with a face full of scars built like a brick wall really need a criminal name or 
reputation to effectively settle scores and collect money from someone?’—actually, yes) and 
(b) they seem to imply that the very findings of the study, as derived from rigorous 
empirical research and analysis, are really not the findings because they don’t fit the 
reviewer’s paradigm or subjective view of organized crime. The reality is that ‘reputation’, 
emerged from both primary datasets as an important theme. This said, some of the 
comments have merit and we have completely restructured and rewritten the front end of 
the paper to better define what enforcement is and why what we discuss in the current 
study meets the definition and how this advances the literature. The new manuscript draws 
on 10 new sources (including the work of Hobbs, Winlow and others cited above) to help 
with this endeavor and now includes many new paragraphs of explanatory material.  
 
I felt the whole piece lacked coherence, organisation, structure and clarity.  I hope these 
comments help developing what I thought was a very interesting empirical piece, which I think 
the article has great potential to be good, but think it requires a very substantial level or 
refocusing and reframing. 
 
We have reorganized, restructured, and clarified. Our sincere thanks again to the 
anonymous reviewer for their comments, which have greatly improved this paper. We hope 
you share this opinion, and very much look forward to your decision shortly.  
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The Authors 
 
